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Abstract: A negative long-run relationship between inequality and 
growth has been found for a variety of inequality measures, but as these 
measures invariably ignore the pro-poor effect of in-kind redistribution, 
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period 1980―2007, in what is believed to be the first inequality-growth 
study of its kind. The results suggest that a negative relationship 
between inequality and growth is present both with and without in-kind 
benefits. The results are robust to changes in model specifications, 
standardization of the inequality variable, control variable definitions 
and generally against removal of single observations. 
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1. Introduction 
During the past two decades, a host of notable scholars have presented evidence 
supporting a negative long-run relationship between economic inequality and 
subsequent growth in GDP per capita. One of the major issues for these studies 
has been to define inequality. While early studies often measure inequality using 
income share of the middle class, newer studies typically use the Gini index for 
income. The robustness of these definitions of inequality can be (and has been) 
questioned, and although measures have been taken to address this challenge1, all 
inequality definitions used so far have ignored the effect of in-kind redistribution. 
In-kind benefits provided by governments are expected to pose an egalitarian effect 
on the wealth distribution, while differ substantially in size across countries 
(Malul, Shapira and Shoham 2013, pp 325―6). Consequently, previous studies may 
systematically overestimate the degree of inequality, and especially for countries 
with large public sectors. 
In this study, I reconsider the hypothesized negative long-run relationship 
between inequality and growth with in-kind benefits incorporated into the Gini 
index for net incomes. I run several cross-country regressions with the modified 
Gini index and compare with the results of collateral estimates with the traditional 
Gini. The analysis includes tests of inferential assumptions and robustness with 
regard to model specification, standardization of the inequality measurement, 
variable definitions, potentially influential observations etcetera. 
The following section summarizes the main theories for causal inequality-growth 
relationship. Section 3 reviews the literature with focus on findings in empirical 
inequality-growth studies. Section 4 explains the methodology of this study, the 
choice of time period, the inequality measure and the theoretical models for the 
statistical study. Section 5 presents the data used in this thesis. Section 6 presents 
the regression estimates and analyzes the results. Section 7 discusses the results, 
potential implications and concludes the thesis. 
 
 
1 For instance, by using the Gini index for measuring land holdings rather than income and by 
taking averages of measured inequality over a longer time period. 
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2. Theories 
The literature offers a number of theoretical explanations for causal relationship 
between inequality and subsequent economic growth. These theories are generally 
categorized into channels by the mechanism through which they are predicting 
inequality to affect economic growth. Short explanations of the main2 theories 
follow. 
2.1. The Savings Rate Channel 
As some papers suggest that rich individuals tend to save a higher fraction of 
their income than do poor, and higher savings rates generally mean more 
investment―one of the main sources for growth―it has been argued that a highly 
concentrated income distribution could be beneficial for growth (Clarke 1995, p 
404; Odedokun and Round 2004, p 290). Although the crucial assumption that rich 
people save a higher fraction of their income has been questioned, some evidence 
in support for the hypothesis is found in Dynan, Skinner and Zeldes (2004). This 
is probably the most commonly discussed channel among the few ones suggesting 
a positive relationship between inequality and growth. 
2.2. The Fiscal Policy Channel 
The Fiscal Policy Channel was presented in the early stages of inequality-growth 
studies by several authors, most notably Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson 
and Tabellini (1994)3. In these models, unequal distribution of income results in 
political pressure for growth-harming redistribution by the government4 
(Odedokun and Round 2004, p 290; Knowles 2005, p 137). This pressure for 
redistribution is typically viewed through principles of the median-voter theorem, 
 
 
2 As for “main”, those theories Perotti (1996, p 150) call “main three approaches” and what is 
believed to be the most commonly discussed channel predicting a positive inequality-growth 
relationship are included. 
3 Although Alesina and Rodrik’s (1994) and Persson and Tabellini’s (1994) theoretical models 
differ somewhat (see Alesina and Rodrik 1994, p 468), they are similar enough to commonly be 
viewed as one channel, for example, Perotti (1996), Tanninen (1999) and Amarante (2014). 
4 For instance, in Persson and Tabellini’s (1994) model, it can be viewed as a fixed tax rate on 
capital income redistributed equally as a lump-sum to each individual. 
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where concentration of aggregate income (indeed, any distribution as long as the 
average income is higher than the median voter’s) will incentivize voters to request 
redistribution (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Perotti 1996, pp 150―1; Barro 2000, p 6). 
Naturally, the inequality effect on growth explained by this channel is expected to 
be long-run and stronger in democracies than non-democracies. However, several 
factors affecting the premises for the democracy effect has been suggested. For 
instance, Tanninen (1999, p 1116) mention that the situation might be complicated 
if poor individuals are less likely to vote (in Persson and Tabellini 1994, the only 
factor affecting electoral participation is age), Barro (2000, p 7) claim that, under 
the presence of lobbying, the degree of redistribution need not correspond to the 
one preferred by voters and Alesina and Rodrik (1994, p 466-8) point out that also 
dictators has to consider public opinion due to the risk of subversion, which in this 
regard diminish the boundary between democracies and non-democracies. 
Numerous papers have investigated the democracy effect and the channel itself. 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) find support for the channel, and (consistent with the 
democracy effect) the result only holds for democracies when splitting the sample. 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) also support the channel, but find no evidence for the 
democracy effect. However, Perotti (1996), Odedokun and Round (2004) and an 
array of other papers find no evidence for the channel. Woo (2011, p 289) conclude 
that “there is little evidence that high inequality leads to more redistribution”. 
2.3. The Civil Disorder Channel 
The Civil Disorder Channel is based on social unrest: as high inequality 
promotes civil unrest, crimes and several other notions of sociopolitical instability, 
property rights are threatened and the risk associated with investments increases. 
Through this higher financial risk, civil disorder diminishes investment and 
retards economic growth (Barro 2000, p 7; Odedokun and Round 2004, p 291). The 
ample concept of sociopolitical instability can further be divided into two types; one 
measuring how regularly the government changes5 and another measuring the 
 
 
5 This definition is not identical to the one offered by Alesina and Perotti (1996, p 1205) where 
this type of sociopolitical instability emphasizes the likelihood of governmental change, rather than 
the observed frequency. 
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social unrest (Perotti 1996, p 173). The two definitions might be interrelated (a 
high degree of civil unrest might for instance affect the likelihood of governmental 
turnover) (Alesina and Perotti 1996, p 1206―7). Although the choice of definition 
is a contextual matter (Alesina and Perotti 1996), most published papers studying 
this channel seem to apply some kind of proxy for the latter definition. This 
channel is expected to apply in both democracies and non-democracies (Barro 2000, 
p 7) and to work in the long-run (Knowles 2005, p 137). When testing this channel, 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) construct an index for sociopolitical unrest (the latter 
definition) which is based on the number of assassinations in the economy, human 
casualties in mass violence (relative to whole population), number of successful 
coups and number of unsuccessful coups, and execute simultaneous bivariate 
regression models where one model uses the index for sociopolitical unrest as one 
of several explanatory variables for growth. They find support for this channel and 
so do Perotti (1996) and Odedokun and Round (2004), doubt about this channel is 
expressed in Woo (2011). 
2.4. The Poverty Trap Channel 
As theoretically formalized by Galor and Zeira (1993) in what is now known as 
the Poverty Trap Channel, if an unequal distribution of wealth prevents poor from 
investing in education, then the inequality can be a suboptimal condition for 
growth. Their model is based on individuals who live for two periods in an economy 
with imperfect capital markets, in the first period the individuals can (if 
affordable) invest in education and hence earn a higher income in the second 
period. At the end of the second period, they leave the unconsumed wealth as 
bequest, therefore adding an inter-generational feature of the model where 
individuals need not start the first period with equal wealth6. (Galor and Zeira 
1993) 
As noted by Deininger and Squire (1998, p 267), this channel can explain 
inequality that persists through generations. Odedokun and Round (2004, pp 
 
 
6 In fact, the inherited wealth is the only difference between the individuals in the model (Galor 
and Zeira 1993). 
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316―7) report evidence in support for this channel, and so do Perotti (1996), but 
emphasizes that this channel is relatively problematic to test. Like several other 
theories on the inequality-growth relationship, this one is expected to apply in a 
long-run perspective (Knowles 2005, pp 137―8). 
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3. Literature Review 
The study of the long-run inequality-growth relationship has to a large extent 
been a story of new theories and refinements in data quality and quantity, followed 
by empirical studies either screening the theories or estimating the magnitude of 
the inequality impact on growth. The rich empirical literature on the long-run 
inequality-growth relationship is mostly homogenous in method but represents a 
wide range of country samples, time periods, datasets, model specifications and 
inequality definitions. In this section, the principles and findings of inequality-
growth studies are outlined. 
Obviously, the effect of inequality on growth may be conditional upon the time 
frame in consideration. Hence, studying the impact of inequality on growth 
requires time consideration. For short-run studies (typically 5 years of consecutive 
growth) it is possible to estimate the effect of inequality using panel data, thereby 
taking country specific characteristics into account and study the effect within (as 
opposed to across) economies (Forbes 2000, p 878). But as noted by several 
researchers (e.g., Odedokun and Round 2004, p 298; Knowles 2005, p 145), 
quantity limitations of inequality data prevents long-run panel studies (often 
involving growth periods of 25 to 30 years). Long-run effects of inequality on 
growth have instead been studied using cross-sectional data (Bagchi and Svejnar 
2015, p 507). Whereas most inequality-growth studies seem to suggest a negative 
relationship (Bénabou 1996, pp 14―5; Dominicis, Florax and Groot 2008, pp 
661―4; Neves, Alfonso and Silva 2016, pp 388―90), cross-sectional studies tend to 
result in negative inequality-coefficients more often than panel studies (Dominicis 
et al. 2008, p 677)7. Different estimations by cross-sectional and panel studies 
might be explained by the fact that panel studies focus on short-run growth while 
cross-sectional studies focus on the long-run (Forbes 2000, p 885). Knowles (2005, 
p 137―9) offers an explanation for the positive relationship between inequality and 
 
 
7 When testing whether the data type affect the results, Neves et al. (2016, pp 394―395) find a 
significant difference (only considering published studies), Dominicis et al. (2008) does not (when 
also including non-published papers). 
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growth sometimes estimated by panel studies, namely that the channels (discussed 
below) through which inequality affect growth probably work in the long-run. 
Not only is inequality expected to impact growth, growth is generally believed to 
affect inequality as well (see Kuznets 1955 for seminal work on the latter 
relationship). In order to decrease simultaneity (i.e., the growth-inequality impact) 
in long-run studies, inequality is (in principle) measured at the beginning of a pre-
defined growth period. It appears not to exist theoretical support for any specific 
time period length (and the choice of time period is generally not motivated for 
reasons not concerning data limitations), but two common base years are 1960 and 
1970, and the typical end year has changed over time (see Table 1 for examples). 
The following Table 1 summarizes the results of cross-sectional inequality-
growth studies. In selecting studies for the table, they have been included if they 
are based on cross-sectional data, and to potentially decrease the impact of 
publication bias8, both published articles and working papers are included. 
Multiple regressions from the same source are included if they use different 
inequality measures. If multiple regressions use the same inequality measure, 
then the most basic regression has been included in the table with regard to RHS-
variables.9 The table should be interpreted with some caution as studies are not 
collected systematically and may not be used as a representative sample of 
inequality-growth studies10.    
 
 
8 The results from published studies may not reflect the overall results from all studies. For 
instance, Neves et al. (2016) find some support for the notion that significant results get published 
with a higher likelihood than insignificant results. 
9 Significance of inequality-coefficients are purposely left out from Table 1, for two main reasons. 
First, several factors affecting the coefficient (including definitions, country sample (region, obs. 
quality etc.), data transformation and estimation method) are not presented in the table. Second, 
significance of a coefficient is based on a t-test, for which the t-statistic only hold under certain 
assumptions. Test of such assumptions are not always covered in articles. 
10 For an overview of systematically collected studies, see Neves et al. (2016, p 391). 
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Table 1. Cross-Country Regressions on Inequality and Growth 
         Study Coef. Period Obs. Inequality variable Control variables Dataset 
       
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ―ve 1960―1985 46 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Fields (1989), Jain 
(1975) 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) ―ve 1960―1985 49 Land Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Taylor and Hudson 
(1972) 
Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) 
―ve† 1960―1985 49 Income share of middle quintile GDP per capita, Human capital Paukert (1973) 
Clarke (1995) ―ve 1970―1988 74 Gini 
GDP per capita, Political instability, Homicides, 
Investment mean deviance, Primary schooling, 
Secondary schooling, Size of gov’t 
Social Indicators by 
United Nations 
Clarke (1995) ―ve 1970―1988 74 Theil Ditto 
Social Indicators by 
United Nations 
Clarke (1995) ―ve 1970―1988 74 Income Variance Ditto 
Social Indicators by 
United Nations 
Clarke (1995) ―ve 1970―1988 81 
Relative income of richest 
quintile to the two poorest 
Ditto 
Social Indicators by 
United Nations 
Perotti (1996) ―ve† 1960―1985 67 
Income share of 2nd and 3rd 
richest quintiles 
GDP per capita, Male schooling, Female schooling, 
Investment deflator to US 
Jain (1975), Lecaillon, 
Paukert and Morrison 
(1984) 
Galor and Zang (1997) ―ve 1960―1988 73 Gini 
GDP per capita, Fertility, Primary schooling, 
Spending on education by gov’t 
Paukert (1973) 
Galor and Zang (1997) ―ve† 1960―1988 73 
Income share of the three 
poorest quintiles 
Ditto 
Paukert (1973), Jain 
(1975), Lecaillon et al. 
(1984), WDR 
Deininger and Squire 
(1998) 
―ve 1960―1992 87 Gini GDP per capita, Investment 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Deininger and Squire 
(1998) 
―ve 1960―1992 64 Land Gini GDP per capita, Investment FAO 
Li and Zou (1998) ―ve 1960―1990 37 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
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         Study Coef. Period Obs. Inequality variable Control variables Dataset 
       
Li and Zou (1998) ―ve 1960―1990 34 Land Gini GDP per capita, Human capital, Gini Intra muros 
Tanninen (1999) ―ve 1970―1992 49 Adjusted Gini 
GDP per capita, Investment, Secondary schooling, 
Male schooling, Female schooling, East Asia and 
PasificD, OECD without Mexico and YugoslaviaD, 
SocialismD 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Tanninen (1999) ―ve 1970―1992 49 Gini Ditto 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Tanninen (1999) ―ve 1970―1992 49 
Relative income of richest to 
poorest quintile 
Ditto 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Tanninen (1999) ―ve† 1970―1992 49 
Income share of 2nd and 3rd 
quintiles 
GDP per capita, Investment, Secondary schooling, 
Male schooling, Female schooling, East Asia and 
PasificD, Latin AmericaD, OECD without Mexico 
and YugoslaviaD, SocialismD 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Sylwester (2000) ―ve 1970―1985 54 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Castelló and Doménech 
(2002) 
―ve 1960―1990 83 Human Capital Gini 
Income per capita, Human capital, Investment, 
Black market premium, East AsiaD, Latin 
AmericaD, Sub-Saharan AfricaD 
Barro and Lee (2001) 
Castelló and Doménech 
(2002) 
+ve 1960―1990 67 Gini 
Income per capita, Human capital, Investment, 
Black market premium, Human capital, East AsiaD, 
Latin AmericaD, Sub-Saharan AfricaD 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Keefer and Knack (2002) ―ve 1970―1992 56 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Keefer and Knack (2002) ―ve 1970―1992 89 Land Gini GDP per capita, Human capital 
Taylor and Jodice 
(1983) 
Bleaney and Nishiyama 
(2004) 
+ve 1965―1990 49 Gini 
GDP per worker, Gini for developing countries, 
Openness, Life expectancy, Savings by gov’t, 
Climate, Quality of institutions, “Primary product 
exports”, Growth of labor force ― Population growth 
rate, Openness×GDP per worker, “Land-lockedness” 
WIID 
     
 
1
0
 
         Study Coef. Period Obs. Inequality variable Control variables Dataset 
       
Castelló―Climent (2004) ―ve 1975―2000 36 Gini 
GDP per capita, Male schooling, Female schooling, 
Investment price level 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996), WIID 
Castelló―Climent (2004) ―ve 1975―2000 36 Human Capital Gini 
GDP per capita, Male schooling, Female schooling, 
Investment price level, East AsiaD, Latin AmericaD 
Castelló and 
Doménech (2002) 
Odedokun and Round 
(2004) 
―ve 
5 yr. periods in 
1960―2004 ‡ 
63 Gini 
GDP per capita, Population growth rate, Size of 
gov’t 
WIID 
Odedokun and Round 
(2004) 
―ve† 
5 yr. periods in 
1960―2004 ‡ 
63 
Income share of two poorest 
quintiles 
Ditto WIID 
Odedokun and Round 
(2004) 
+ve† 
5 yr. periods in 
1960―2004 ‡ 
63 
Income share of 2nd and 3rd 
richest quintiles 
Ditto WIID 
Odedokun and Round 
(2004) 
―ve 
5 yr. periods in 
1960―2004 ‡ 
63 Income share of richest quintile Ditto WIID 
Knowles (2005) ―ve 1960―1990 40 Gini 
GDP per capita, Male schooling, Female schooling, 
Investment US deviance 
WIID 
Sarkar (2007) ―ve 1970―1987 66 Theil 
GDP per capita, Human capital, Change in capital, 
Change in labor 
UTIP 
Sarkar (2007) ―ve 1970―1987 62 Gini Ditto UTIP 
Castells (2011) ―ve 1970―2007 51 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital, Size of gov’t 
Gruen and Klasen 
(2008) 
Woo (2011) ―ve 1960―2000 55 Gini (avg. in 1960s) GDP per capita, Human capital, Size of gov’t 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Woo (2011) ―ve 1960―2000 51 Gini (avg. in 1970s) GDP per capita, Human capital, Size of gov’t 
Deininger and Squire 
(1996) 
Woo (2011) ―ve 1960―2000 52 Land Gini GDP per capita, Human capital, Size of gov’t FAO 
Assa (2012) б ―ve 1998―2008 72 Gini GDP per capita, Human capital WDI 
The table include estimates of the inequality-growth relationship. Coef. represent sign of estimated inequality coefficient. Significance levels are intentionally excluded from the table (see 
footnote 9, page 7). Dataset refer to the main source(s) for the inequality variable when it is expressed, otherwise are all expressed. Superscript D denote dummy variable. ‡ Odedokun and 
Round (2004) is based on 5 yrs. growth periods in the interval 1960―2004. Some countries have multiple obs. and the authors describe the study as “quasi-panel” (Odedokun and Round 2004, 
p 288). As the study has more similarities with a cross-sectional study than a panel study (Odedokun and Round 2004, p 298) it has been included in the table. † Coefficient is flipped because 
of inequality measure negatively related with inequality in order to enhance comparability. б Assa (2012) present a bivariate base regression with Gini as the only RHS-variable. 
That regression has been disregarded for the purposes of this table.
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In most studies, inequality data at the base year is not found for each country 
and substituted with a value from another year11. Often the closest year with an 
observation is used regardless of whether it is before or after the base year (e.g., 
Knowles 2005), but sometimes observations before the base year are favored to 
avoid reversed causality (e.g., Clarke 1995). 12 The inequality measure is typically 
added as an explanatory variable in a regression model for economic growth 
(Forbes 2000, p 869). These are usually reduced-form regressions of the general 
form 
where ∆ ln(𝑦𝑖) represent endogenous growth of GDP per capita (usually measured 
as the difference in the logarithm of GDP per capita between the beginning and 
end of the growth period13), ∑ (𝛽𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗  represent explanatory variables of 
subsequent growth where 𝛽𝑖,𝑗 is a coefficient of variable 𝑋𝑖,𝑗. Likewise, 𝛽𝑖,𝑛+1 is the 
coefficient of an inequality proxy 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖. 𝛼 is the intercept, 𝜀𝑖 is an error term and 
the subscript 𝑖 indicate country specific variable. Many researchers turn to Robert 
J. Barro’s extensive work (such as Barro 1991) for theoretical determinants of 
economic growth (e.g., Tanninen 1999). The most commonly used determinant in 
regression models for economic growth is GDP per capita (sometimes per worker) 
at the base year, primarily to control for economic convergence and differences in 
countries development (Persson and Tabellini 1994, p 612). Other common RHS-
 
 
11 In some instances, the data is obtained more than 10 years from the beginning of the growth 
period (e.g., Alesina and Perotti 1994; Sylwester 2000).  
12 There are several special cases in treatment of Gini at the base year. For instance, Li and Zou 
(1998) allow for Gini coefficients after the base year but not before (and suggest that the growth 
period of 30 years is enough to compensate for endogeneity). Another rather special case is Woo 
(2011), where the same regression model for the time period 1970―2000 is ran twice, once with 
average Gini values for the 1960s and once with average Gini values for the 1970s. Each time the 
inequality variable obtains a negative coefficient, the former statistically significant at the 0.05 
level, and the latter at the 0.01 level (Woo 2011, p 293). 
13 A scaling of the variable by dividing the expression by the number of growth period terms will 
result in a more intuitive interpretation, namely the average relative growth per term-unit (usually 
years). That is, ln (
𝑌𝑒
𝑌𝑏
) /𝜏 where 𝑌𝑒 is GDP per capita at the end term (𝑒) of the growth period, 𝑌𝑏 is 
GDP per capita at the start term (𝑏) of the growth period and 𝜏 = 𝑒 − 𝑏 is the length of the growth 
period. 
 ∆ ln(𝑦𝑖) = 𝛼 + ∑(𝛽𝑖,𝑗 × 𝑋𝑖,𝑗) + 𝛽𝑖,𝑛+1 × 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑛
𝑗
, (1) 
12 
 
variables include human capital (positive relationship expected, usually proxied 
by participation rate in primary schooling), investment (positive relationship 
expected, typically domestic investment relative to GDP), the size of government 
(negative relationship expected14, measured as government expenditure relative to 
GDP) and dummies to control for regional differences (e.g., Castelló and Doménech 
2002). The Gini index is the most commonly used measurement of inequality 
(Bleaney and Nishiyama 2004), but exceptions include relative wealth of the 
middle class15 and a Gini index for land holdings (again, see Table 1 for examples). 
  
 
 
14 Government expenditure is believed to have a negative impact on growth as it decreases 
savings while not increasing “private productivity” (Barro 1991, p 430). 
15 The term “middle class” can be misleading. It refers to the second and third richest quintiles 
(e.g., Perotti 1996; Tanninen 1999). 
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4. Methodology 
This paper presents an empirical study of the inequality-growth relationship 
based on reduced-form least squares regressions with newly compiled inequality 
data. This section aims to explain the details concerning the methodology. 
4.1. Time Period 
As this thesis is studying subsequent growth following a base year, the time 
period’s length and the choice of base year is considered with respect to the purpose 
of the study. Inequality data tend to increase in quantity over time, and a later 
base year most often allows for a larger sample. However, the Great Recession is 
believed to disturb the inequality effect on growth rates, making it harder to 
interpret regression estimates from growth periods including the crisis. Not 
enough time has passed to conduct long-run studies after the crisis, and hence the 
end of the time period would preferably be before the outbreak. Given that the end 
of the growth period is set as 2007, the base year will determine two factors of high 
relevance for the study: the length of the time period and the number of available 
observations. Many recent studies on inequality-growth has chosen 1970 as base 
year, probably due to the extraordinary large number of Gini observations 
available for that year16. However, although 1970 would be preferable as a base 
year for means of comparison (with regard to base year), it is not optional since the 
inequality variable used in this thesis requires considerably more data to be 
constructed than the inequality measures used in other studies17. Instead of base 
year coordination, the length of the time period in this study is designed to match 
the those of other studies. As mentioned in the section 3, many other studies are 
based on time periods around 25―30 years. The time period chosen for this paper 
 
 
16 In one of the largest databases for Gini observations (WIID, discussed in section 5), 146 Gini 
observations are available for the year 1970. That exceeds the number of observations for a typical 
year around that time by far. It is more than the average number of observations for a year in the 
1950’s (25 observations), 1960’s (67), 1970’s (76) and 1980’s (117). No year until 1989 have as many 
Gini observations as 1970. 
17 Among the variables needed to construct the inequality measure used in this study, (reliable) 
total taxation data by general government is most scarcely available. Availability of data is 
discussed in section 5. 
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is 27 years (1980―2007) which allows for 34 observations. Choosing another base 
year close to 1980 does not cause any major change in the number of observations, 
which is further discussed in section 5. 
4.2. Measuring Inequality using MGINI 
In order to improve the accuracy of inequality measurement, the ordinary Gini 
index can be modified to incorporate in-kind benefits provided by the state. 
Although the size of in-kind redistributions can vary greatly across countries and 
might have substantial implications for inequality (Malul et al. 2013, pp. 324―5), 
this factor is largely ignored by the ordinary Gini index. As the detailed 
information required to calculate the actual effect of in-kind benefits on inequality 
is virtually impossible to obtain for a wide range of countries, a major problem is 
to find alternative ways to include the redistributive effect of in-kind benefits. 
Malul et al. (2013) addresses this problem and presents a method to incorporate 
the approximate effect of in-kind benefits into the Gini coefficient and thereby 
construct what they call Modified Gini Index (hereafter MGINI18). 
Malul et al.’s (2013) modification of the Gini index is based on one critical 
assumption about the progressiveness of the distribution of in-kind benefits, 
namely that every individual is entitled benefits of equal value (analogous to lump-
sum). Under this assumption, in-kind benefits cause a redistributive effect that is 
inevitably egalitarian: the MGINI value for a country can impossibly be larger 
than the corresponding Gini. Although no extensive validation for this assumption 
is presented, Malul et al. (2013) summarize research specifically devoted the 
impact of in-kind benefits on inequality where most support is found for an 
egalitarian effect of in-kind benefits.  
Malul et al.’s (2013) formalization of MGINI follows from an interpolation of 
Gini, as explained below. Similarly to Gini, which is defined as the area of the 
plane between the equality line and the curve of accumulated wealth in the Lorenz 
curve, relative to the area below the equality line, MGINI is defined as the relative 
 
 
18 Typographical note: the inequality measure is written as MGINI, and a variable with the same 
name is written in italic as 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼. 
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size of the corresponding area but with in-kind benefits added to the Lorenz curve. 
Adding in-kind benefits according to the assumption of equal distribution leads to 
the modified Lorenz curve being positioned above the ordinary Lorenz curve, as 
seen in Figure 1.19 
 
Figure 1. Lorenz curves for Gini and MGINI 
 
From the Lorenz curve follow the formal definition of Gini,  
 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 = 1 − 2 ∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
 (2) 
where 𝜃 represent individuals ranked by income, 𝑦(𝜃) is a function describing the 
accumulated income of the poorest 
𝜃
𝑁
 of the population relative to total income, 
where 𝑁 is the total number of individuals in the population. Denoting the income 
of individual 𝑖 as 𝐼𝑖, the Lorenz curve is given by 
 
 
19 Although the original description of the Lorenz curve does not explicitly define each axis, the 
first illustrations was the inverted version of the graph that is now popularized (Lorenz 1905). For 
the sake of convenience, this paper only considers the popularized Lorenz curve. 
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 𝑦(𝜃𝛾) =
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝛾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 , (3) 
where 𝜃𝛾 is some number of the poorest individuals, 𝜃𝛾 ∈ ℕ. This function (Eq. 3) 
can be interpolated to incorporate in-kind benefits according to the assumption of 
equal distribution as described above. Modifying Equation (3) accordingly, the 
modified Lorenz curve is given by: 
 ?̂?(𝜃𝛾) =
𝑦(𝜃𝛾) + 𝜃𝛾
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 (4) 
where 𝐺 is total value of government expenditure. Analogously to the definition of 
Gini (Eq. 3), MGINI is 1 − 2 ∫ ?̂?(𝜃)𝑑𝑥
1
0
 where ?̂?(𝜃) is the function incorporating in-
kind benefits (Eq. 4). Therefore, 
 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 = 1 − 2 ∫ ?̂?(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
=
∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) × 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) + 𝐺
. (5) 
Naturally, as in-kind benefits are largely financed by taxes, using net incomes 
rather than market incomes for measuring ∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) in Equation (5) is preferable. 
Malul et al. (2013, p 325) approximates the total net income by 𝑌(1 − 𝑇). Rewriting 
Equation (5) with this approximation for net incomes gives the formula by which 
MGINI has been estimated for the purposes of this thesis: 
 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 ≈
𝑌(1 − 𝑇) × 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑌(1 − 𝑇) + 𝐺
. (6) 
Hence, the estimation of MGINI requires four variables; Gini, GDP, government 
expenditure and total taxation relative to GDP. A thorough, stepwise derivation of 
MGINI is presented in Appendix 3. 
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4.3. The Models 
The purpose of this section is to explain the details regarding the regression 
models of the thesis. 
In line with other studies, this study estimates models with Barro-type 
regressors20 for growth with an additional inequality-variable (Eq. 1). The models 
are used to estimate the inequality impact on subsequent growth while controlling 
for other variables that are theoretically justified predictors for growth. To this 
end, several regression models are estimated following a successively extended 
base model. The base model used in this thesis is 
 𝐺𝑅8007𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 (M1) 
where 𝐺𝑅8007 is the annual growth rate of GDP per capita following the base year 
(1980) until the end of the growth period (2007). Formally 𝐺𝑅8007 is measured as 
the difference between the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at the end year 
and the natural logarithm of GDP per capita at the base year, divided by the length 
of the growth period (as described in section 3): 
 
𝐺𝑅8007 =
ln (
𝑌07
𝑌80
)
27
. 
(7) 
𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 is the (natural) logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980, and is included 
to control for economic convergence. 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 represent the inequality proxy of the 
model, either Gini or MGINI. 
The second model is extending the base model by adding an investment term: 
 𝐺𝑅8007𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. (M2) 
 
 
20 For a discussion on Barro-regressors frequently used in inequality-growth studies, see Clarke 
(1995). 
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In this model, investment (𝐼𝑁𝑉) is measured as domestic investment relative to 
GDP in 1980, and is believed to be positively related with subsequent growth. A 
base model similar to M2 is used by Deininger and Squire (1998). 
The third model introduces a proxy for human capital (𝐻𝐶, measured as 
educational attainment): 
 𝐺𝑅8007𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 × 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 + 𝛽3 × 𝐻𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽4 × 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖. (M3) 
The human capital variable (𝐻𝐶) is defined as the participation rate in primary 
schooling and is widely believed to pose a positive effect on economic growth. 
Human capital is not measured unambiguously but believed to be of importance 
for growth prediction, this potential problem is the topic of section 5.3. 
Lastly, a variable for the size of government (𝑆𝑂𝐺) is added (measured as 
government expenditures relative to GDP). Size of government is a Barro-variable 
commonly found to be negatively related to growth (e.g., Odedokun and Round 
2004). The fourth theoretical model is: 
 
𝐺𝑅8007𝑖 = 𝛼 
+ 𝛽1 × 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝑖 
+ 𝛽2 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖 
+ 𝛽3 × 𝐻𝐶𝑖 
+ 𝛽4 × 𝑆𝑂𝐺𝑖 
+ 𝛽5 × 𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄𝑖 
+ 𝜀𝑖. 
(M4) 
These four growth models are all estimated with four measures of inequality: 
ordinary Gini, a standardized Gini, ordinary MGINI and a standardized MGINI. 
Further extensions of model M4 are not made due to the relatively small sample 
size (as mentioned in section 4.1 and thoroughly discussed in section 5). Other 
model specifications are estimated in section 6.3, but with the purpose of testing 
the sensitivity with regard to model specification. 
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5. Data 
This section presents data sources and definitions, discusses the details of the 
data and presents the data sample used for estimating the regressions. As sample 
differences are undesirable for the means of comparability between inequality 
measures, the sample of countries for which MGINI is calculated will be used for 
estimations throughout this thesis. Therefore, even though a larger sample can be 
obtained with Gini as the inequality measure, only countries with MGINI 
observations are considered21. This sample is hereafter referred to as the MGINI-
sample. 
5.1. MGINI 
The variables required for the calculation of MGINI are total tax revenue by 
general government relative to GDP, government expenditure relative to GDP, 
Gini and GDP. In this subsection, the variables will be discussed in turn. 
The taxation data are digitalized from the Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook 1989 by IMF (1989). The taxation measure includes all taxes collected by 
the general government as a fraction of GDP in 1980. Tax data are found for 47 
countries22. 
Government expenditure and GDP are obtained from Penn World Table (PWT) 
by Feenstra, Inklaar and Timmer (2015). Version 8.1 of PWT released in April 
2015 is used. Government expenditure in PWT is measured as a fraction of GDP. 
Further, real GDP in 1980 (measured in 2005 USD) is also available from the same 
source. Of the 47 countries with taxation data in 1980, 43 countries also have data 
on both government expenditure and GDP. 
The Gini values come from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID) by 
UNU-WIDER (2015). This paper uses WIID 3.3 released in September 2015. The 
 
 
21 This is a common procedure in inequality-growth studies with multiple inequality proxies, see 
for instance Galor and Zang (1997) who use the same country sample with Gini and the income 
share of the three poorest quintiles, Tanninen (1999) who use the same country sample with four 
different inequality proxies, and Castelló―Climent (2004) who use the same sample with Gini and 
Human Capital Gini. 
22 Although tax data for Netherlands Antilles is also available from the source, it is not included 
since it is estimated based on an extrapolation. 
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WIID database is compiled by data from multiple (over 300) sources. Despite 
relatively extensive coverage of the database, many countries do not have any 
known Gini value for the year 1980 (yet other countries have several estimates). 
The following discriminatory procedure is used when selecting Gini values. In the 
cases where no known Gini value is found for the base year, data from other years 
close to 1980 are used instead. Data from closer years are strictly preferred and no 
Gini values are obtained more than 5 years from the base year. Although 
observations after the base year are likely affected by endogeneity and 
observations before the base year might not be representative for inequality in 
1980, using observations from other years than the base year is necessary with 
respect to the sample size. Also, as noted by Deininger and Squire (1996, p 578) 
and Knowles (2005, p 151), Gini coefficients generally change slowly over time. 
Most of the Gini values used for calculating MGINI are obtained no later than one 
year from the base year, and the mean year distance to the base year is 0.88.23 A 
modest increase in time interval for acceptable Gini observations does not increase 
the sample size more than marginally (moreover, even a doubling of the time 
interval to 1980±10 years only yield three additional observations). 
When multiple Gini observations are available for the same year, the welfare 
definition has been considered. Gini observations based on net incomes has been 
preferred to those based on gross incomes24. Further, the data in WIID are 
classified by quality as “High”, “Average”, “Low” or “Not known”.25 If multiple Gini 
values exist for the same year and is based on the same welfare definition, then 
the value with the higher quality is preferred. “Low” quality is preferred to “Not 
known” in order to minimize uncertainty about the dataset quality.26 Prioritizing 
 
 
23 The time distance to the base year is often greater for comparatively poor countries than for 
richer ones. 
24 The database also include Gini observations based on expenditure, (unspecified) income and 
“Other”. Expenditure based Gini values and (unspecified) income values are not common and the 
sample used in this thesis does not include any such. Gini values based on “Other” has not been 
considered because of difficulties transforming such observations. 
25 The quality classification is based on three factors: knowledge about “concepts underlying the 
observations”, the “income/consumption concept” and “the survey quality” (Tarp 2015, pp 14―5). 
26 In the MGINI-sample 16 Gini values are of “High” quality, 5 of “Average” quality, 13 of “Low” 
quality and no observations of “Not known” quality. Gini values for developed countries tend to be 
of higher quality than for developing countries, potentially causing to more uncertainty in the 
measurement of inequality for the latter. 
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quality over welfare unit does not cause any change in the sample. If observations 
are identical in terms of (i) year, (ii) welfare unit and (iii) quality, then (iv) country 
area coverage, (v) population coverage, (vi) age coverage and (vii) income unit are 
considered in the given order. Larger coverage is preferred and “Individual” is 
preferred to “Household” (which is preferred to “Tax unit” and “Other”) as income 
unit. In the cases where multiple observations remain after following this process 
of selection, the average Gini value of the remaining observations is used. 
Deininger and Squire (1996, pp 580―1) find, when comparing countries with Gini 
data based on income and expenditure, that those based on income on average are 
0.066 units higher than Gini values based on expenditure. Following this discovery 
Gini values are sometimes transformed by adding 0.066 (or some other value as 
the difference has been suggested to decrease over time, e.g., Frazer 2005, p 1479) 
to Gini coefficients based on expenditure. In the MGINI-sample, no Gini 
observations are based on expenditure, but a mixture of net incomes and market 
incomes are present. As disposable income tends to be more equal than gross 
incomes (Malul et al. 2013, p 324), Gini observations based on net and market 
incomes are not perfectly comparable. Despite this, several studies do not express 
consideration regarding net or market based Gini index (e.g., Forbes 2000; Bleaney 
2004). As an attempt to make the Gini observations in the sample more comparable 
(and suitable for calculation of MGINI), the Gini observations based on gross 
incomes has been transformed by adding the value27 0.0908. In addition to the 
MGINI described above, an alternative MGINI variable is calculated based on a 
standardized Gini index (as described in section 5.2). 
The MGINI values in the sample are on average 0.07 units (or 20%) lower than 
the corresponding Gini values, with a standard deviation of 0.02 units (or 7 
percentage points). When the countries are ranked monotonically by the value of 
Gini and MGINI, only 9 of 34 countries have the same rank in both cases (the 
average change in rank is 2.1 with a standard deviation of 2.1). For some countries, 
in-kind benefits have a significant impact. For instance, Israel has the 21st lowest 
 
 
27 The value 0.0908 is the average difference between Gini observations based on net incomes 
and market incomes in the (87) cases where countries in the interval (1970―1990) has high quality 
observations based on both welfare definitions in the WIID 3.3 database. 
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Gini value (0.36) in the sample but the 12th lowest MGINI (0.22), similarly Ireland 
has the 22th lowest Gini (0.36) but the 16th lowest MGINI (0.27). The differences 
between Gini and MGINI are presented for the entire MGINI-sample in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Difference between Gini and MGINI around 1980 
 
 
The mean MGINI in the sample is 0.29 (the mean Gini is 0.35), with a standard 
deviation of 0.09 (0.09 for Gini). Wealthy countries usually have lower Gini values 
than poor countries, and the sample used in this thesis suggest that the same is 
true for MGINI (the correlation between GDP per capita in 1980 and Gini is –071, 
–0.73 for MGINI, see Table 3, page 29).  
5.2. Other Inequality Variables 
For the purposes of comparison and robustness testing, the inequality-growth 
estimates are replicated with different inequality measures. The MGINI measure 
is compared with Gini (𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼), a standardized Gini (𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼) and a standardized 
MGINI (𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼). 
As discussed in section 5.1, the Gini observations are obtained from WIID and 
are presented in Appendix 1. Although Gini values are acquired in a systematized 
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manner, potential problems of comparability may persist due to various differences 
in survey conduction (examples in section 5.1). As an attempt to address this 
problem, Solt (2014) uses an algorithm for standardizing Gini values to make them 
comparable and provides imputations for missing observations. A standardized 
Gini (𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼) for net incomes is calculated as the mean of the 100 imputations 
presented in the SWIID dataset by Solt (2014). SWIID 5.0 released in October 2014 
is used. The standardized Gini coefficients are furthermore used to calculate an 
alternative MGINI index (𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼). The sources for government expenditure, 
taxes and GDP are the same as for MGINI (again, see section 5.1).28 
5.3. Human Capital 
The primary measure for human capital used in this thesis is average years of 
schooling undertaken by individuals aged 25 or above (𝐻𝐶). This data has been 
obtained from the Barro―Lee Educational Attainment Dataset by Barro and Lee 
(2013). Version 2.0 released in June 2014 is used. All observations correspond to 
the year 1980 and data for all countries in the MGINI-sample are found. 
As human capital can be measured in a multitude of ways, two alternative 
measures are also used to test for the sensitivity of the 𝐻𝐶 variable; one similar 
measure and one more distinct but commonly used in other studies. First, a 
variable for the enrollment ratio in primary school in 1980 (𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅) is used. Data 
for this measure is obtained from the UIS.Stat database by UNESCO (2015) and 
is found for 31 of the 34 countries in the MGINI-sample. As in Odedokun and 
Round (2004, p 297), this variable is measured as the (natural) logarithm of the 
enrollment rate: 
 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 = ln (
𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑠
𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑝
), (8) 
 
 
28 The method used for standardizing Gini coefficients for SWIID has been questioned (e.g., 
Jenkins 2014), and albeit the relatively large database, it does not allow for more MGINI 
coefficients to be calculated in 1980 than the (ordinary) Gini. Therefore, the standardized MGINI 
is not used as the main measurement for inequality. 
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where, 𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑜𝑏𝑠 is number of individuals enrolled in primary schooling and 𝐸𝑁𝑅𝑒𝑥𝑝 
is number of individuals expected to participate in primary schooling by their age. 
Although this measure is commonly used in inequality-growth studies (and hence 
would increase comparability with other studies), it is not used as the primary 
human capital measure in this thesis as it (i) is not believed to be an accurate 
measure of human capital29 and (ii) would imply an additional loss of two sampling 
units. A notable difference between 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 and 𝐻𝐶 (and 𝐼𝐻𝐶 described below) is 
that 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 only measure human capital among young individuals (in the age of 
expected primary school participation), thereby emphasizing future human 
capital30. 
A second alternative to 𝐻𝐶 is the Index of Human Capital (𝐼𝐻𝐶). This index is 
based on interpolations of average years of schooling and the returns to education 
(Feenstra et al. 2015, p 3172) and is obtained from PWT 8.1. Data are found for all 
countries in the MGINI-sample. This variable is not used as the primary human 
capital measure as it is not as commonly used or discussed in the literature as 
average years of schooling. 
5.4. Additional Variables 
The growth variable 𝐺𝑅8007 (average yearly growth rate of real GDP per capita, 
see Eq. 7) used as the dependent variable in the regressions is calculated using 
data on population size and real GDP per capita (in 2005 USD) at the base and end 
year. These variables are obtained from PWT 8.1 and found for all 34 countries in 
the MGINI-sample. 
A variable for GDP per capita is also used (𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶). Like most other studies 
(Knowles 2005, p 155; Forbes 2000, p 879), this variable is defined as the (natural) 
logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2005 USD) at the base year. Hence, 
 
 
29 The 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 measure may be questioned as a measure of human capital for several reasons. 
For instance, the 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 variable usually has a low correlation with other human capital proxies 
and a larger value of 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 follow when few individuals are able to successfully finish primary 
school within the expected time (which might not indicate a higher degree of human capital). The 
countries with the highest primary school enrollment rate in the MGINI-sample is Kenya (1.20), 
followed by Mexico (1.16), Chile (1.16) and Colombia (1.16). 
30 Indeed, as 𝐻𝐶 measure human capital of individuals 25 years and older, no one individual is 
considered in both 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 and 𝐻𝐶. 
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 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 = ln(𝑌80). (9) 
A variable for (gross) capital formation in 1980 (𝐼𝑁𝑉) is obtained for all countries 
in the MGINI-sample. This data comes from World Development Indicators by the 
World Bank (2015). 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is defined as gross domestic investment relative to GDP 
in 1980: 
 𝐼𝑁𝑉 =
𝐼80
𝑌80
. (10) 
Finally, a proxy for the size of government is added. Analogously to 𝐼𝑁𝑉, this 
variable (𝑆𝑂𝐺) is (as in several other studies, e.g., Woo 2011) defined as total 
consumption expenditure in 1980 by the general government relative to GDP in 
1980, as the quotient 
 𝑆𝑂𝐺 =
𝐺80
𝑌80
. (11) 
The data for this variable is obtained for all countries in the MGINI-sample from 
World Development Indicators by the World Bank (2015). 
Also, a variable for the black market premium (𝐵𝑀𝑃) is used in a robustness test 
of M2. Despite difficulties in quantifying black market premiums, an estimate is 
sometimes used as a proxy for market stability (e.g., Castelló and Doménech 2002). 
Black market premium is expected to be negatively related with subsequent 
growth. Data for this variable is found for 32 countries in the MGINI-sample from 
the Global Network Growth Database by Easterly (2001). 
5.5. The Sample 
This section discusses the MGINI-sample with regard to its representativeness 
of the world population of countries. All data observations for the inequality 
variables are available in Appendix 1 and data for other variables are available in 
Appendix 2. 
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Naturally, countries who achieved recognition after 1980 or who’s recognition 
ceased before 2007 are not included in the MGINI-sample, possibly leading to 
unproportioned exclusion of relatively unstable states. Likewise, inequality data 
tend to be more scarcely available for developing countries than for wealthy ones 
(Castelló and Doménech 2002, p C188), causing concern about biased estimates. A 
study of the countries in the MGINI-sample indicate that wealthy countries are 
proportionally overrepresented. For instance, only 8.8% (Kenya, Malawi and South 
Africa) of the countries in the sample are African, and only 11.8% are Asian (Israel, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand).31 The representation of developed and 
democratic countries is relatively high; 17 of the 24 OECD-members in 1980 
(OECD 2015) are included in the sample (i.e., half of the countries in the sample 
are OECD-members) and 24 (70.6%) of 34 countries in the MGINI-sample are 
democracies32 (compared to 57 (30.5%) of 187 states with democracy data in 1980 
in the Polyarchy Dataset 2.0 by Vanhanen 2000b). The mean GDP per capita in 
1980 (9,600 USD) in the MGINI-sample is lower than the mean of the 143 states 
with data in PWT 8.1 (9,700 USD). However, as countries without GDP per capita 
data for 1980 in PWT 8.1 typically are LDCs, the sample mean may very well be 
above the population mean. 
Descriptive statistics for the variables in the MGINI-sample is presented in 
Table 2.  
 
  
 
 
31 Hence, no state in the Middle East or Northern Africa is included in the MGINI-sample except 
Israel. 
32 A state is considered a democracy if it has a value of 5.0 or higher in the Polyarchy Index of 
Democracy. The threshold is suggested by Vanhanen (2000a) and the source for the democracy 
index is the Polyarchy Dataset 2.0 by Vanhanen (2000b). 
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Table 2. Summary Statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min.  Max.  
GINI 34 0.353 0.091 0.197 (SWE) 0.508 (MWI) 
MGINI 34 0.288 0.090 0.133 (SWE) 0.446 (COL) 
NSGINI 34 0.369 0.123 0.204 (SWE) 0.588 (ZAF) 
NSMGINI 34 0.303 0.119 0.138 (SWE) 0.517 (COL) 
GR8007 34 0.024 0.012 0.000 (KEN) 0.053 (IRL) 
LNGDPPC 34 9.173 0.865 6.645 (MWI) 10.173 (CHE) 
INV 34 0.259 0.054 0.159 (GTM) 0.450 (SGP) 
HC 34 6.785 2.805 1.750 (MWI) 11.940 (USA) 
IHC 34 2.389 0.542 1.366 (MWI) 3.366 (USA) 
LNGER 31 0.002 0.136 ―0.456 (MWI) 0.181 (KEN) 
SOG 34 0.172 0.065 0.080 (GTM) 0.401 (ISR) 
BMP 32 0.046 0.180 ―0.233 (ZAF) 0.943 (MWI) 
Country codes follow the ISO 3166-1 apha-3 standard. 
 
From table 2, it follows that Malawi and South Africa have the highest 
inequalities in the sample when measured as 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, but when in-kind 
benefits are incorporated, Colombia has the highest inequality both when 
measured using the standardized and unstandardized version of MGINI. 
Table 3 presents correlations between the variables of the MGINI-sample. A high 
correlation is found for all pairwise constellations of inequality variables, with the 
strongest ones being between the Gini indexes and their respective MGINI (0.968 
for  𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, 0.987 for 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼). As expected based on 
previous studies (e.g., Perotti 1996, p 156; Woo 2011, p 292), a negative correlation 
is found between inequality and growth. 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 is found negatively correlated with 
subsequent growth (―0.48), which is also evident from the scatter plot of Figure 3, 
and the same is true for 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 (―0.52), 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 (―0.46) and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 (―0.42).33 
 
 
 
33 Scatter plots with 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 against economic growth are available in 
Appendix 4. 
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Figure 3. Scatter plot of MGINI against growth 
 
 
The correlation between the logarithm of GDP per capita (𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶) and each 
respective inequality variable is relatively high (close to 0.7 for 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, 
and even higher for 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 respectively). Correlations above 0.5 are 
found between several the inequality proxies and control variables; the potential 
problem of multicollinearity is addressed in section 6.2. 
The two human capital proxies 𝐻𝐶 and 𝐼𝐻𝐶 are highly correlated (0.97), which is 
not surprising as the 𝐼𝐻𝐶 is based on 𝐻𝐶. However, both 𝐻𝐶 and 𝐼𝐻𝐶 have 
correlation coefficients below 0.20 with the commonly used human capital variable 
𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅. In fact, the only variable for which 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 has a correlation above 0.25 is 
𝐵𝑀𝑃. 
In addition to the correlation matrix, scatter plots with each of the explanatory 
variables against the average growth rate (𝐺𝑅8007) are available in Appendix 4. 
From these plots, no specific non-linear pattern is apparent, but some clustering is 
found (usually composed by one group of developed countries per scatter plot). 
Further, two outliers are distinguishable. First, Singapore had an investment rate 
(𝐼𝑁𝑉) in 1980 of 0.45 (second highest was 0.34) followed by the second highest 
average growth rate in the sample. Also, Israel had by far the largest governmental 
sector (𝑆𝑂𝐺) relative to GDP in 1980 (0.40, second largest which was 0.27), followed 
by a modest average growth rate between 1980 and 2007 of 0.017 annually. In 
robustness tests (section 6.3), regression models will be re-estimated without these 
sample points. 
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix 
 
MGINI       GINI      NSGINI   NSMGINI   GR8007  LNGDPPC     INV           HC             IHC       LNGER        SOG         BMP 
MGINI             
GINI 0.968            
NSGINI 0.943 0.915           
NSMGINI 0.948 0.883 0.987          
GR8007 ―0.476 ―0.524 ―0.458 ―0.422         
LNGDPPC ―0.696 ―0.691 ―0.772 ―0.747 0.310        
INV ―0.041 ―0.106 ―0.116 ―0.070 0.342 0.047       
HC ―0.717 ―0.675 ―0.770 ―0.774 0.294 0.770 ―0.049      
IHC ―0.706 ―0.657 ―0.767 ―0.773 0.363 0.725 ―0.012 0.973     
LNGER 0.018 0.048 ―0.044 ―0.061 0.114 0.243 0.062 0.147 0.199    
SOG ―0.559 ―0.343 ―0.501 ―0.625 0.000 0.310 ―0.218 0.460 0.466 0.089   
BMP 0.269 0.307 0.308 0.270 ―0.307 ―0.612 ―0.171 ―0.405 ―0.402 ―0.654 ―0.016  
The table presents Pearson’s product moment correlation coefficients. Shaded cells correspond to correlation (ρ) as defined below. 
 
0.75 ≤ |ρ| 
0.50 ≤ |ρ| < 0.75 
0.25 ≤ |ρ| < 0.50 
|ρ| < 0.25 
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6. Results 
In this section, estimates of the four model specifications (section 4.3) are 
presented, explained and analyzed.34 The regression models are estimated with 
each inequality proxy and negative inequality impact is tested35 for each case. The 
succeeding analysis serves the purpose of testing the reliability of the inference. 
For mnemonic purposes, a table including all regression variables and brief 
descriptions is presented in Appendix 10. 
6.1. Estimates of the Models 
Table 4 includes estimates for the four main model specifications. As seen in the 
table, a significant linear relationship at the 0.05 level is found between inequality 
and subsequent growth for all combinations of inequality proxy and model 
specification except five (regression (4), (7), (8), (11) and (12)). As the model is 
extended, the explanatory power (when adjusting for number of regressors) 
increases for each inequality proxy from M1 to M2 (adding 𝐼𝑁𝑉), decreases from 
M2 to M3 (adding 𝐻𝐶), and increases for three of the four inequality variables from 
M3 to M4 (adding 𝑆𝑂𝐺). The only model extension that significantly (at the 0.05 
level) increases the explanatory power of the model (for any given inequality proxy) 
is when 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is added to M1 for 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼36. Furthermore, the 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 variables have 
lower adjusted R2 than their corresponding Gini variables for each model except 
 
 
34 As an in-depth analysis of each model and inequality proxy would be extensive to the degree 
that it would be inconvenient for the reader, one of the regressions (M2 with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as inequality 
proxy) will be discussed more in detail than others. This model is chosen as it contains the most 
extensive model without violating the rule of thumb of no more than 𝑛 10⁄  RHS-variables, and 
𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 is used as it is regarded the main inequality proxy of interest in this thesis. The analysis 
can easily be applied to the other regressions. 
35 All statistical tests in this paper uses a significance level of 0.05. 
36 This conclusion is not obvious from the output in Table 4, but can easily be confirmed with an 
F-test (test statistic is 𝐹𝑜𝑏𝑠 =
(𝑅𝑈𝑅
2 −𝑅𝑅
2 )/𝑚
(1−𝑅𝑈𝑅
2 )/(𝑛−𝑘)
~𝐹𝑚,(𝑛−𝑘) which in this case simplifies to 𝐹𝑜𝑏𝑠 =
(𝑅𝑈𝑅
2 −𝑅𝑅
2 )(𝑛−𝑘)
(1−𝑅𝑈𝑅
2 )
~𝐹1,(𝑛−𝑘), 𝑅𝑈𝑅
2  is explanatory power of the unrestricted model, 𝑅𝑅
2 is explanatory power 
of the restricted model, 𝑚 is number of restrictions, 𝑛 is sample size and 𝑘 is number of regressors 
(including the static) in the unrestricted model). 
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Table 4. Regression Results 
 GR8007 is dependent variable in each regression 
Model 
 
M1 
(1) 
M1 
(2) 
M1 
(3) 
M1 
(4) 
M2 
(5) 
M2 
(6) 
M2 
(7) 
M2 
(8) 
M3 
(9) 
M3 
(10) 
M3 
(11) 
M3 
(12) 
M4 
(13) 
M4 
(14) 
M4 
(15) 
M4 
(16) 
                 
LNGDPPC ―0.001 
(―0.47) 
0.000 
(―0.19) 
―0.002 
(―0.43) 
0.000 
(―0.05) 
―0.001 
(―0.36) 
―0.001 
(―0.25) 
―0.001 
(―0.32) 
0.000 
(―0.03) 
―0.001 
(―0.35) 
―0.001 
(―0.16) 
―0.001 
(―0.26) 
0.000 
(―0.04) 
―0.002 
(―0.42) 
―0.002 
(―0.50) 
―0.002 
(―0.54) 
―0.002 
(―0.56) 
INV     0.066 * 
(1.96) 
0.075 ** 
(2.17) 
0.067 * 
(1.88) 
0.073 * 
(2.02) 
0.066 * 
(1.90) 
0.074 ** 
(2.10) 
0.067 * 
(1.79) 
0.073 * 
(1.95) 
0.060 
(1.66) 
0.058 
(1.64) 
0.052 
(1.35) 
0.050 
(1.31) 
HC         0.000 
(0.01) 
0.000 
(―0.08) 
0.000 
(―0.05) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
0.000 
(0.25) 
0.000 
(0.21) 
0.000 
(0.15) 
0.000 
(0.10) 
SOG             ―0.026 
(―0.79) 
―0.061 
(―1.67) 
―0.046 
(1.25) 
―0.072 * 
(―1.72) 
GINI ―0.081 *** 
(―2.81) 
   ―0.075 ** 
(―2.72) 
   ―0.075 ** 
(―2.52) 
   ―0.077 ** 
(―2.58) 
   
MGINI  ―0.070 ** 
(―2.30) 
   ―0.069 ** 
(―2.40) 
   ―0.070 ** 
(―2.20) 
  ―0.096 *** 
(―2.77) 
 
NSGINI   ―0.055 ** 
(―2.16) 
   ―0.049 * 
(―2.00) 
   ―0.050 * 
(―1.77) 
   ―0.064 ** 
(―2.14) 
 
NSMGINI    ―0.045 * 
(―1.76) 
   ―0.042 * 
(―1.73) 
   ―0.042 
(―1.49) 
   ―0.077 ** 
(―2.26) 
Constant 0.065 
(1.83) 
0.049 
(1.38) 
0.058 
(1.43) 
0.039 
(1.01) 
0.044 
(1.23) 
0.031 
(0.89) 
0.034 
(0.84) 
0.018 
(0.49) 
0.044 
(1.20) 
0.030 
(0.85) 
0.034 
(0.83) 
0.019 
(0.48) 
0.052 
(1.35) 
0.061 
(1.56) 
0.060 
(1.30) 
0.066 
(1.41) 
N 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
F 0.006 0.018 0.024 0.048 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.020 0.009 0.017 0.032 0.046 0.017 0.012 0.035 0.029 
R2 0.280 0.228 0.215 0.178 0.361 0.332 0.297 0.276 0.361 0.333 0.297 0.276 0.375 0.393 0.335 0.345 
Adj. R2 0.233 0.178 0.164 0.125 0.298 0.266 0.227 0.204 0.273 0.240 0.200 0.177 0.264 0.284 0.216 0.228 
White’s test 0.432 0.281 0.271 0.267 0.914 0.852 0.807 0.655 0.978 0.959 0.880 0.844 0.942 0.959 0.860 0.910 
Shapiro―W 0.035 0.042 0.029 0.042 0.040 0.038 0.055 0.102 0.039 0.038 0.057 0.101 0.026 0.033 0.045 0.070 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively (two-tailed t-test, H0: 𝛽𝑗 = 0). N is the number of observations. F is the p-value for test of overall model significance 
(H0: 𝛽1 = 𝛽2 = ⋯ = 𝛽3 = 0 for all coefficients of varying regressors). White’s test is the p-value for White’s test of heteroscedasticity. Shapiro―W is the p-value for the Shapiro―Wilk test of 
normally distributed error terms. All models are estimated using OLS.
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M4 (that is, when size of government it controlled for). All regressions in Table 4 
are found significant in overall model tests (see F in Table 4 for p-values). 
For the first three regression models, 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 obtain larger negative coefficients 
than 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 (and 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 than 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼), but the reversed is true for the estimates 
of M4. Each estimated inequality coefficients is significantly negative (one-tailed 
test) at the 0.05 level except for 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 in regression (12). For instance, 
regression (6) with the estimated model 
 
𝐺𝑅8007̂ = 0.031 − 0.001 × 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 + 0.075 × 𝐼𝑁𝑉 − 0.069 × 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼, 
 
suggests that (ceteris paribus) a one standard deviation (0.09 units) higher 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 
value on average is associated with a 0.6 percentage points lower average annual 
growth rate from 1980 to 2007. 
As for the control variables, 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶 is not found significant in any of the 
regressions in Table 4, and hence no evidence for economic convergence is found. 
A significant coefficient (at the 0.05 level) for GDP at the base year is commonly 
found in the empirical literature, e.g., Clarke (1995), Deininger and Squire (1998) 
and Woo (2011). Compared to this the regressions of this paper, those studies 
consider other time periods and have larger sample sizes, potentially affecting the 
result. 
As expected, the control variable 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is significantly positive at the 0.05 level for 
all estimates of M2 and M337. Significantly positive (at the 0.05 level) coefficients 
for investment are typically found, see for instance Deininger and Squire (1998) 
who present a significantly positive coefficient with the same RHS-variables as 
M2. The correlation between 𝐼𝑁𝑉 and 𝑆𝑂𝐺 is found relatively low (―0.22) in Table 
3 (and 𝐼𝑁𝑉 does not have a considerably high VIF for any of the regressions in 
Table 4 as discussed below), but nonetheless, the coefficient of 𝐼𝑁𝑉 is found 
insignificant in all regressions after 𝑆𝑂𝐺 is added (regressions (13)―(16)). 
 
 
37 That is, the estimates of the regression models corresponding to the theoretical models M2 and 
M3. 
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Human capital (𝐻𝐶), expected to be positively related with future growth, is not 
found significantly positive for any regression in Table 4. Previous studies present 
mixed results for human capital variables, for instance, Sylwester (2000) obtain 
insignificant coefficients (at the 0.05 level) and so do Li and Zou (1998) when 
measuring human capital using the enrollment rate in primary schooling, Galor 
and Zang (1997) obtain significant positive coefficients for the same proxy when 
also controlling for public spending on education, and Sarkar (2007) find 
significantly positive coefficients when measuring inequality using the logarithm 
of average years of schooling. The two alternative human capital proxies, 𝐼𝐻𝐶 and 
𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅, replace 𝐻𝐶 in regressions presented in section 6.3. 
 𝑆𝑂𝐺 is not found significantly negative in three out of four regressions in Table 
4, which is similar to the results of Woo (2011) where a larger sample is used and 
more control variables are included in the model. Several other studies find a 
significant negative coefficient of this variable, see for instance Odedokun and 
Round (2004). However, It should be acknowledged that the regressions (13)―(16) 
(and to some degree the regressions (9)―(12)) ought to be interpreted with caution 
as the number of explanatory variables is large relative to the sample size. 
6.2. Reliability Tests 
All regressions of Table 4 are tested for heteroscedasticity using White’s test and 
graphically using residual plots. The p-values for rejection of homoscedasticity 
using White’s test are found in Table 4 (second last row). The test does not reject 
homoscedasticity at the 0.05 significance level for any regression. The residuals of 
regression (6) are plotted against the conditional estimates in Figure 4. No clear 
sign of heteroscedasticity or model misspecification is obvious from the figure. This 
is true for all regressions in Table 4, and residual plots for regression38 (2), (5), (7), 
(8), (10) and (14) are found in Appendix 5. 
 
 
 
 
38 Appendix 5 is limited to present all residual plots for regression model M2, but only the 
residual plots with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as inequality measures for the other model specifications (except model 
M2 with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as inequality variable, which is presented in Figure 4 above). 
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Figure 4. Residual plot for regression (6) 
 
 
 
The brief discussion on multicollinearity from section 5.1 (based on the 
correlation matrix, Table 3) is complemented with an analysis of Variance Inflation 
Factor. VIF is calculated for each explanatory variable and regression model, and 
the factors are obtainable from Appendix 6. As the VIF values are generally low 
and does in no case exceed 5, multicollinearity is not believed to cause sensitive 
coefficient estimates.39 
As the inference statements of the previous section assume normally distributed 
error terms, the reasonableness of this assumption is tested with a numerical test 
and also studied graphically40. First, as the sample size is relatively small, the 
Shapiro―Wilk test is performed using the residuals of each regression. The p-
values of the Shapiro―Wilk test (with a null hypothesis of normally distributed 
data) are presented in Table 4 (Shapiro―W therein). For most of the regressions 
(11 of 16) the null hypothesis is rejected at the 0.05 level, indicating that the error 
terms are not following a normal distribution. Second, to complement the 
numerical test, the residuals are studied further using Quantile―Quantile plots. 
The Q―Q plot for regression (6) (for which normally distributed error terms is 
rejected using the Shapiro―Wilk test) is presented in Figure 5, in which the 
 
 
39 The largest VIF is 4.57 for 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 in regression (16) and the second largest VIF is found for 
𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 in regression (15) with a VIF of 3.74 (most of the inequality proxies have considerably lower 
values). 
40 Note that this assumption is critical for the t-statistic, it is not necessary for OLS to be BLUE 
by the Gauss―Markov theorem. 
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residuals are standardized. Q―Q plots for six other regressions are found in 
Appendix 7. 
 
Figure 5. Q―Q plot for regression (6) 
 
The pattern of the residuals systematically deviates from the diagonal line, 
supporting the claim that the normal assumption is not fulfilled. However, if the 
deviations from the normal distribution are not considered large, then the central 
limit theorem may suggest that a sample size of 34 observations is enough to 
approximate the distribution of the error terms with a normal distribution. The 
conclusion may depend of the purpose of the inference. 
Influence of single observations are studied with respect to both the inequality 
coefficient and model predictions. First, to test the influence of single observations 
on the inequality-growth relationship, the p-value for a negative inequality-
coefficient is re-calculated for each regression with the observations excluded (one 
at a time) from the sample (i.e., a systematic exclusion of observations following 
jackknife principles). The following figure presents the results for regression (6), 
with the p-value for a negative inequality coefficient measured on the vertical axis 
(one-tailed test with H0: 𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 = 0) and the excluded country presented on the 
horizontal axis. 
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Figure 6. Single obs. influence on ineq. coef. in reg. (6) 
 
As seen in Figure 6, the exclusion of single observations does in no case result in 
an insignificant (negative) coefficient at the 0.05 significance level. The highest p-
value is found when excluding Mexico (with the collateral p-value 0.037). A similar 
result is not found for all regressions. For instance, exclusion of a single 
observation in regression (14) does in no case result in a p-value over 0.015, but in 
regression (7), excluding any of the three countries Sri Lanka, Mexico or South 
Africa results in an insignificant negative inequality coefficient (at the 0.05 level). 
The corresponding plots for six other regressions are presented in Appendix 8. 
Second, to investigate the potential presence of influential observations for 
entire models41, Cook’s distance is calculated for every observation in each 
regression of Table 4. Figure 7 presents the calculated Cook’s distances for the 
observations in the estimate of M2 with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as the inequality variable. 
 
 
 
 
41 This is one among several ways to test the robustness of the models used to investigate the 
inequality-growth relationship. 
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Figure 7. Cook’s distances for regression (6) 
 
With the commonly used threshold for which an observation is defined as 
influential if  𝐷𝑖 > 4 𝑛⁄ = 0.12 (where 𝐷𝑖 is Cook’s distance for observation 𝑖 and 𝑛 
is number of observations), regression (4) includes two influential observations: 
Malawi and Kenya. For most of the regressions in Table 4, a similar number of 
observations are considered influential for model predictions. Cook’s distances for 
six regressions of Table 4 are presented in Appendix 9. 
6.3. Sensitivity Regressions 
As pointed out in the discussion on the MGINI-sample (section 5), some 
observations have been found to deviate considerably from the rest. Singapore had 
an extraordinarily large investment rate in 1980 and Israel had by far the largest 
government when measured as its spending relative to GDP (again, see Appendix 
2 for data and Appendix 4 for scatter plots). To test the impact of these 
observations, regression (5) and (6) are executed again without Singapore, and 
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regression (13) and (14) are executed again with Israel omitted.42 The new 
estimates are found in Table 5, (17)―(20). 
Following the discussion on difficulties quantifying human capital, the low and 
insignificant coefficient estimates preceding 𝐻𝐶 (and its impact on the estimate of 
the inequality variable’s coefficient) may be sensitive to the definition of human 
capital. Therefore, two alternative human capital-variables are used in model 
specification M3: Index of Human Capital (𝐼𝐻𝐶) and participation rate in primary 
schooling (𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅). These variables are discussed in section 5.3 and the regressions 
are found in Table 5, (21)―(24). 
The negative relationship between inequality and growth found significant for 
most regressions in Table 4, may be sensitive to model specifications. In order to 
test this possibility, two alternatives to model M2 are established. One of the new 
models include 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶, the inequality proxy and black market premium (𝐵𝑀𝑃) 
on the RHS, while the other include43 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶, the inequality proxy and 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅. 
Estimations with the alternative model specifications are found in Table 5, 
(25)―(29). 
For practical reasons, Table 5 is limited to only include the supplementary 
regression estimates for 𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼. 
 
 
42 Note that the re-estimation of models without the outliers is distinct from the study of 
influential observations above.  
43 This is likely the most common base model for inequality-growth studies. Although human 
capital is measured various ways, some version of this model is used among others by Alesina and 
Rodrik (1994), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Li and Zou (1998) and Sylwester (2000). It is not the 
base model in this thesis for reasons explained in section 5.3 (page 23). 
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Table 5. Sensitivity Regression Estimates 
 GR8007 is dependent variable in each regression 
 
w/o SGP 
(17) 
w/o SGP 
(18) 
w/o ISR 
(19) 
w/o ISR 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
(22) 
 
(23) 
 
(24) 
 
(25) 
 
(26) 
 
(27) 
 
(28) 
             LNGDPPC ―0.001 
(―0.49) 
―0.001 
(―0.35) 
―0.001 
(―0.42) 
―0.002 
(―0.52) 
―0.002 
(―0.71) 
―0.002 
(―0.50) 
―0.002 
(―0.70) 
―0.002 
(―0.48) 
―0.005 
(―1.52) 
―0.006 
(―1.55) 
―0.003 
(―0.91) 
―0.002 
(―0.67) 
INV 0.047 
(1.07) 
0.053 
(1.19) 
0.058 
(1.59) 
0.057 
(1.55) 
0.050 
(1.06) 
0.059 
(1.25) 
0.069 * 
(2.00) 
0.076 ** 
(2.18) 
    
HC 
  
0.000 
(0.22) 
0.000 
(0.17) 
        
LNGER 
    
0.016 
(1.00) 
0.013 
(0.80) 
    
0.018 
(1.15) 
0.015 
(0.93) 
IHC 
      
0.004 
(0.68) 
0.003 
(0.55) 
    
SOG 
  
―0.034 
(―0.78) 
―0.076 
(―1.53) 
        
BMP 
        
―0.023 * 
(―1.73) 
―0.026 * 
(―1.90) 
  
GINI ―0.076 *** 
(―2.74) 
 
―0.081 ** 
(―2.50) 
 
―0.084 ** 
(―2.56) 
 
―0.069** 
(―2.33) 
 
―0.085 *** 
(―3.10) 
 
―0.092 *** 
(―2.85) 
 
MGINI 
 
―0.071 ** 
(―2.45) 
 
―0.102 ** 
(―2.72) 
 
―0.077 ** 
(―2.27) 
 
―0.062 * 
(―1.94) 
 
―0.085 *** 
(―2.95) 
 
―0.083 ** 
(―2.47) 
Constant 0.051 
(1.36) 
0.039 
(1.08) 
0.055 
(1.36) 
0.067 
(1.61) 
0.062 
(1.40) 
0.046 
(1.08) 
0.043 
(1.19) 
0.029 
(0.82) 
0.102 ** 
(2.60) 
0.100 ** 
(2.50) 
0.083 ** 
(2.11) 
0.068* 
(1.74) 
N 33 33 33 33 31 31 34 34 32 32 31 31 
F 0.011 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.029 0.048 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.020 0.043 
R2 0.313 0.285 0.372 0.393 0.329 0.299 0.371 0.339 0.334 0.317 0.300 0.257 
Adj. R2 0.242 0.211 0.256 0.280 0.226 0.192 0.285 0.248 0.262 0.244 0.223 0.175 
White’s test 0.891 0.743 0.672 0.767 0.964 0.732 0.932 0.974 0.708 0.489 0.885 0.609 
Shapiro―W 0.023 0.028 0.023 0.029 0.037 0.064 0.021 0.025 0.060 0.452 0.081 0.130 
*, **, *** refer to significance at the 01, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively. N is number of obs. F is p-value for test of model significance. All regression models are estimated using OLS.
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Table 5 does not contradict the negative inequality-growth relationship (from 
Table 4). The omission of Singapore (regression (17) and (18)) did not cause any 
major change in coefficient estimate of the inequality variables; they are still 
significantly negative (one-tailed test) at the 0.05 level. However, the investment 
variable (which is significantly positive in the estimation of M2, Table 4, regression 
(5) and (6)) is not found significantly positive at the 0.05 level without Singapore. 
Neither does the exclusion of Israel (regression (19) and (20)) support worries about 
sensitivity of regressions (13)―(14). The inequality-growth impact remains 
significantly negative at the 0.05 level with Israel removed from the sample, and 
all control variables remain insignificant. This conclusion also holds when 
estimating the corresponding regression model with the standardized inequality 
variables. 
The inequality coefficient remain negative and significant when replacing 𝐻𝐶 as 
the human capital variable of M3 (Table 4, (9)―(12)), again this conclusion also 
holds for 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼. As expected, the explanatory power is higher for 
the estimates with 𝐻𝐶 and 𝐼𝐻𝐶 than for 𝐿𝑁𝐺𝐸𝑅 (see section 5.5). 
The two alternative models specifications, estimated in Table 5, (25)―(28), result 
in significant negative estimates of the inequality coefficients. This result is 
significant at the 0.05 level and holds for 𝑁𝑆𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and 𝑁𝑆𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼. Also, 𝐵𝑀𝑃 is 
estimated to have a significant negative impact on subsequent growth as expected.  
None of the regressions in Table 5 contradicts a negative inequality-growth 
relationship. Contrary, a significant negative relationship at the 0.05 level is found 
between inequality and growth for every regression in Table 5, indicating that the 
negative relationship between inequality and growth is robust to the adjustments 
tested for by the sensitivity regressions. 
None of the variables in regression (17)―(28) have a VIF above 5 (see Appendix 
6), and hence multicollinearity is not believed to disturb estimated coefficient 
variances. Also, all regressions in Table 5 have been tested for heteroscedasticity 
using White’s test (see Table 5, second last row). Test of normally distributed error 
terms is performed for each regression in Table 5. Shapiro―Wilk’s test of normal 
distribution does not reject normally distributed error terms with a 0.05 
significance level for 5 of the 12 regressions in Table 5. Under non-normal 
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distribution of error terms, the inferential tests may be unreliable. However, as 
mentioned, if the distribution is close to normal, the central limit theorem may 
allow for a normal approximation (if a normal approximation is appropriate for 
any specific regressions is not unambiguous).  
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7. Discussion and Conclusions 
This paper has investigated the long-run relationship between economic 
inequality and growth in GDP per capita. It did so through reduced-form OLS 
regressions and both with and without in-kind benefits incorporated into the 
inequality definition. The result, a significant negative relationship between 
inequality and growth, is found for a variety of settings and is also in line with the 
bulk of long-run inequality-growth studies (e.g., Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Clarke 
1995; Perotti 1996; Li and Zou 1998; Sylwester 2000; Keefer and Knack 2002; 
Knowles 2005; Castells 2011; Woo 2011). The result has been shown to be robust 
to changes in variable definitions, model specifications, standardization of the 
inequality variable and exclusion of outliers. Additionally, two tests of influential 
observations (not necessarily outliers) has been presented. First, with respect to 
the influence on the inequality-growth relationship specifically, were it was found 
that the inequality coefficient is not significantly negative if specific observations 
were removed from the sample. Second, Cook’s distance has been calculated and 
indicate that the typical regression has about two influential observations for the 
model prediction. Test for heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity did not cause 
concern. For some regressions, normally distributed error terms were rejected, but 
whether the deviation in these cases is large enough (given the CLT) to disturb the 
t-statistic is not unambiguous. 
Naturally, also the significant results of this study should be interpreted with 
some caution. An unavoidable problem for the reliability of studies based on cross-
country regressions, is the potential risk of omitted variables controlling for 
country specific characteristics (Dominicis 2008, p 659). This study is based on 
frequently used (and theoretically supported) growth variables, but as the sample 
size is relatively small, the possibility of constructing extensive models is 
restricted, potentially increasing the probability of omitted variable bias. 
Although this paper has presented some evidence of a negative inequality-
growth relationship, the channels through which such an effect work are not 
studied, and as noted by Woo (2011, p 289), policy implications may be derived 
from studies of specific channels, rather than reduced-form regressions. Although 
policies for reduction of inequality may enhance future growth through one or 
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multiple inequality-growth channels, the implementation of such policies could 
likewise cause unintended consequences that may counteract positive impacts on 
growth. The negative inequality-growth relationship found in this study, is a 
relationship of association; no changes in one states’ degree of inequality has been 
studied. Policy recommendations are avoided. 
Instead of policy recommendations, the findings of this study may have other 
implications. For instance, as this is believed to be the first paper to investigate 
the inequality-growth relationship using MGINI, it provides the first estimates 
indicating that the Gini index is negatively related with growth also when in-kind 
redistribution is incorporated. Consequently, as this study generally find similar 
results for Gini and MGINI, the evidence of this paper enhance the reliability of 
other studies’ results using the Gini index as inequality proxy. However, it is 
important to acknowledge that although a negative relationship between 
inequality and economic growth is supported by the estimates of the paper, it is 
not imperative that the magnitude is large enough to make the relationship of any 
practical importance.44 
As for future research, a natural extension of this study would be to test specific 
channels (sections 2.1―2.4) using MGINI. Again, the calculated MGINI coefficients 
are obtainable from Appendix 1, and for methods of channel-testing, see for 
instance Odedokun and Round (2004) and Woo (2011). 
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Appendix 1. Inequality Data 
Country Taxation Gov’t exp. GDP Years Gini MGINI NSGINI NSMGINI 
         
Australia 0.2710 0.1715 772.140  +1  0.310 0.251 0.273 0.221 
Austria 0.3993 0.1731 284.894  +1  0.223 0.173 0.265 0.206 
Barbados 0.2733 0.1492 6.524  0  0.309 0.256 0.442 0.366 
Belgium 0.4333 0.2275 328.350  −1  0.283 0.202 0.242 0.173 
Brazil 0.2203 0.0920 1,607.913  0  0.469 0.420 0.507 0.454 
Canada 0.3141 0.2143 1,190.889  0  0.285 0.217 0.282 0.215 
Chile 0.2627 0.1245 230.519  0  0.441 0.377 0.495 0.424 
Colombia 0.1230 0.1007 344.504  0  0.497 0.446 0.576 0.517 
Costa Rica 0.1713 0.1822 36.762  +1  0.475 0.389 0.435 0.357 
Denmark 0.4545 0.2580 191.901  0  0.322 0.219 0.241 0.164 
Finland 0.3259 0.1773 177.167  +1  0.219 0.173 0.209 0.165 
France 0.3931 0.2090 1,929.771  +1  0.316 0.235 0.303 0.225 
Greece 0.2756 0.1532 266.082  +1  0.368 0.304 0.347 0.287 
Guatemala 0.1057 0.0796 49.351  −1  0.406 0.373 0.542 0.497 
Ireland 0.3403 0.2218 202.891  0  0.364 0.272 0.345 0.258 
Israel 0.3617 0.4005 159.493  −1  0.363 0.223 0.301 0.185 
Kenya 0.2167 0.1980 61.229  +2  0.482 0.385 0.537 0.429 
Luxembourg 0.4088 0.1617 28.972  +5  0.253 0.199 0.258 0.203 
Malawi 0.1700 0.1929 12.400  +5  0.508 0.412 0.558 0.453 
Mexico 0.1725 0.1004 1,370.467  −3  0.485 0.432 0.494 0.440 
Netherlands 0.4577 0.2309 638.770  +1  0.275 0.193 0.244 0.171 
New Zealand 0.3297 0.1955 108.021  0  0.257 0.199 0.264 0.205 
Norway 0.4490 0.1869 314.199  −1  0.267 0.199 0.222 0.166 
Panama 0.2034 0.1760 37.651  0  0.384 0.315 0.435 0.356 
Peru 0.2126 0.1373 199.973  +1  0.479 0.408 0.568 0.484 
Singapore 0.1681 0.0965 224.406  0  0.316 0.283 0.365 0.327 
South Africa 0.2100 0.1429 477.168  0  0.490 0.415 0.588 0.498 
Spain 0.2437 0.1363 1,296.734  0  0.336 0.285 0.318 0.270 
Sri Lanka 0.1947 0.0855 100.058  0  0.346 0.313 0.379 0.343 
Sweden 0.4308 0.2732 315.554  0  0.197 0.133 0.204 0.138 
Switzerland 0.2995 0.0943 332.225  +2  0.323 0.285 0.315 0.278 
Thailand 0.1400 0.1229 585.272  +1  0.362 0.316 0.429 0.375 
United Kingdom 0.3451 0.2068 1,944.486  0  0.253 0.192 0.269 0.205 
United States 0.2776 0.1589 13,161.431  0  0.347 0.284 0.303 0.248 
         Taxation refers to all taxes to the general government in 1980 as a fraction of GDP, source: GFSY, IMF (1989). Gov’t exp. is 
the total government expenditure as fraction of GDP in 1980, source: WDI, World Bank (2015). GDP is real GDP (in billion 
2005 USD) in 1980, source: PWT 8.1, Feenstra et al. (2015). Years refer to the number of years from the base year the Gini 
index was obtained, ± denote that multiple observations were equally close to the base year both after and prior to 1980. In 
these cases, the mean of the point estimate before and after is calculated. Gini values come from WIID 3.3, UNU-WIDER 
(2015). 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 is calculated using taxation in 1980, government expenditure in 1980, GDP in 1980 and Gini as close to 1980 
as possible. 
48 
 
Appendix 2. Supplementary Data 
Country GR8007 LNGDPPC INV     HC    IHC LNGER   SOG BMP OECD  DEM 
            
Australia 0.023 9.885  0.272 10.79  3.26 0.10   0.171 0  1 1 
Austria 0.029 9.664  0.289 8.2  2.38 ―0.04   0.173 0  1 1 
Barbados 0.033 9.195  0.198 6.29  2.38 0.01   0.149 0.08  0 1 
Belgium 0.022 9.764  0.266 8.05  2.67 0.06   0.228 0  1 1 
Brazil 0.022 8.459  0.233 2.93  1.45 NaN   0.092 0.02  0 0 
Canada 0.020 9.945  0.235 9.84  2.97 ―0.01   0.214 0  1 1 
Chile 0.031 8.694  0.210 6.4  2.31 0.15   0.125 0.06  0 0 
Colombia 0.007 8.777  0.191 4.26  1.87 0.15   0.101 0.01  0 1 
Costa Rica 0.007 8.835  0.266 5.31  2.13 0.05   0.182 0  0 1 
Denmark 0.023 9.833  0.211 7.31  2.80 ―0.03   0.258 0  1 1 
Finland 0.026 9.726  0.312 7.39  2.61 ―0.03   0.177 0  1 1 
France 0.016 9.886  0.257 5.96  2.08 0.11   0.209 0  1 1 
Greece 0.025 9.398  0.306 6.55  2.34 0.00   0.153 0.07  1 1 
Guatemala 0.002 8.154  0.159 2.36  1.48 ―0.37   0.080 0.22  0 1 
Ireland 0.053 9.325  0.273 8.4  2.93 0.04   0.222 0  1 1 
Israel 0.017 9.581  0.224 9.93  2.94 0.02   0.401 0.01  0 1 
Kenya 0.000 7.406  0.245 2.49  1.66 0.18   0.198 0.22  0 0 
Luxembourg 0.040 9.927  0.196 8.22  2.61 ―0.11   0.162 NaN  1 1 
Malawi 0.006 6.645  0.247 1.75  1.37 ―0.46   0.193 0.94  0 0 
Mexico 0.007 9.246  0.272 3.92  1.87 0.15   0.100 0.03  0 0 
Netherlands 0.027 9.838  0.237 9.25  2.80 ―0.01   0.231 0  1 1 
New Zealand 0.022 9.560  0.215 11.31  3.32 0.07   0.195 0  1 1 
Norway 0.042 9.985  0.283 8.83  2.77 ―0.01   0.187 0  1 1 
Panama 0.027 8.610  0.281 5.9  2.24 0.06   0.176 0  0 0 
Peru 0.026 8.165  0.275 5.27  2.14 0.12   0.137 0  0 1 
Singapore 0.044 9.612  0.450 3.74  1.94 NaN   0.097 NaN  0 1 
South Africa 0.009 8.952  0.299 4.82  1.91 NaN   0.143 ―0.23  0 0 
Spain 0.031 9.444  0.242 5.74  2.13 0.09   0.136 0  1 1 
Sri Lanka 0.034 7.585  0.338 6.13  2.45 ―0.01   0.085 0.09  0 1 
Sweden 0.026 9.737  0.275 9.62  2.82 ―0.03   0.273 0  1 1 
Switzerland 0.019 10.173  0.332 10.98  2.99 ―0.19   0.094 0  1 1 
Thailand 0.040 7.992  0.291 2.67  1.78 ―0.04   0.123 ―0.05  0 0 
United Kingdom 0.023 9.738  0.204 8.13  2.50 0.04   0.207 0  1 1 
United States 0.020 10.144  0.233 11.94  3.37 ―0.01   0.159 0  1 1 
            GR8007 is average yearly relative growth between 1980 and 2007, source: PWT 8.1, Feenstra et al. (2015). LNGDPPC is 
the natural logarithm of GDP per capita in 1980, source: PWT 8.1, Feenstra (2015). INV is domestic investment relative to 
GDP in 1980, source: WDI, World Bank (2015). HC is average years of schooling in 1980, source: BLD 2.0, Barro-Lee (2013). 
IHC is Index of Human Capital in 1980, source: PWT 8.1, Feenstra (2015). LNGER is the logarithm of the participation rate 
in primary schooling in 1980, source: UIS.Stat, UNESCO (2015). SOG is government expenditure relative to GDP in 1980 
(proxy for size of government), source: PWT 8.1, Feenstra (2015). BMP is black market premium in 1980, source: GDNGD, 
Easterly (2001). OECD is a dummy variable for OECD membership in 1980 (1 if OECD member, 0 otherwise), source: OECD 
(2015). DEM is a dummy variable for democracy in 1980 (1 if democracy, 0 otherwise; see footnote 32, page 26), source: PD 
2.0, Vanhanen (2000b). 
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Appendix 3. Derivation of MGINI 
This appendix derives the MGINI coefficient of Malul et al. (2013). The definition 
of Gini is 
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖 =
1
2 − ∫ 𝑦
(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
1
2
= 1 − 2 ∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
 
where 𝑦(𝜃𝛾) is a function for the Lorenz curve, which follows  
𝑦(𝜃𝛾) =
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝛾
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
  
where 𝑦(𝜃𝛾) is the share of total incomes that are obtained by the 𝜃𝛾 individuals 
with the lowest incomes. Modifying this function to also include in-kind benefits 
where the value of incomes increases to 𝐼𝑖 +
𝐺
𝑁
, ∀ 𝑖 ∈ ℕ;  𝑖 ≤ 𝑁, results in the 
modified Lorenz curve where 𝐺 denote total value of government expenditure:  
 ?̂?(𝜃𝛾) =
∑ (𝐼𝑖 +
𝐺
𝑁)
𝛾
𝑖=1
∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) + 𝐺
=
𝑦(𝜃𝛾) +
𝛾 × 𝐺
𝑁 × ∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝑦(𝜃𝛾) + 𝜃𝛾
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
. 
With the modified Lorenz curve, MGINI can be written as follows: 
𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 = 1 − 2 ∫ ?̂?(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
= 1 − 2 ∫
𝑦(𝜃) + 𝜃 ×
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑑𝜃
1
0
= 1 − 2 [
∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
+ ∫ 𝜃 ×
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
 𝑑𝜃
1
0
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
] = 1 − 2 [
∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
+
1
2 ×
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
=
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
− 2 (∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
+
1
2 ×
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
)
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
1 − 2 ∫ 𝑦(𝜃)𝑑𝜃
1
0
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
1 +
𝐺
∑ 𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
=
∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) × 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 ) + 𝐺
. 
With the approximation ∑ (𝐼𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1 )  ≈ 𝑌(1 − 𝑇): 
𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 ≈
𝑌(1 − 𝑇) × 𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖
𝑌(1 − 𝑇) + 𝐺
. 
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Appendix 4. Scatter Plots 
This appendix includes scatter plots of 𝐺𝑅8007 against each control variable in 
Table 4 except 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 (which is presented in Figure 3, page 28). 
 
Fig. A1. Gini against growth 
 
 
 
Fig. A2. Standardized Gini against growth 
 
 
 
Fig. A3. Standardized MGINI against growth 
 
 
 
Fig. A4. GDP per capita against growth 
 
 
 
Fig. A5. Investment against growth 
 
Figure A6. Human capital against growth 
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Figure A7. Size of gov’t against growth 
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Appendix 5. Residual Plots 
This appendix presents residual plots for some of the regressions in Table 4 
(section 6.1). One residual plot for M2 with each inequality proxy (except 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 
which is presented in Figure 4, page 34), and M1, M3 and M4 with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 are 
included. Residual plots for the remaining regressions are available upon request. 
 
Fig. A8. Residual plot for regression (2) 
 
Fig. A9. Residual plot for regression (5) 
 
Fig. A10. Residual plot for regression (7) 
 
Fig. A11. Residual plot for regression (8) 
 
Fig. A12. Residual plot for regression (10) 
 
Fig. A13. Residual plot for regression (14) 
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Appendix 6. Variance Inflation Factors 
Regression 
M1 
(1) 
M1 
(2) 
M1 
(3) 
M1 
(4) 
M2 
(5) 
M2 
(6) 
M2 
(7) 
M2 
(8) 
M3 
(9) 
M3 
(10) 
M3 
(11) 
M3 
(12) 
M4 
(13) 
M4 
(14) 
M4 
(15) 
M4 
(16) 
w/o 
SGP 
(17) 
w/o 
SGP 
(18) 
w/o 
ISR 
(19) 
w/o 
ISR 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
(22) 
 
(23) 
 
(24) 
 
(25) 
 
(26) 
 
(27) 
 
(28) 
                             
GINI 1.92    1.94    2.17    2.20    1.93  1.95  2.26  2.16  1.93  2.15  
MGINI  1.94    1.94    2.31    2.88    1.96  1.93  2.20  2.33  2.05  2.15 
NSGINI   2.48    2.52    3.18    3.74              
NSMGINI    2.26    2.27    2.95    4.57             
LNGDPPC 1.92 1.94 2.48 2.26 1.92 1.94 2.49 2.26 2.85 2.77 3.05 2.87 2.87 2.89 3.21 3.17 1.92 1.96 1.94 1.93 2.36 2.33 2.54 2.47 2.79 3.04 2.28 2.28 
INV     1.01 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.04 1.03 1.07 1.04 1.10 1.10 1.17 1.18 1.02 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.01     
HC         2.80 2.98 3.18 3.26 3.07 3.07 3.24 3.26             
SOG             1.36 1.67 1.57 2.07             
LNGER                     1.20 1.16     1.18 1.15 
IHC                       2.36 2.54     
BMP                         1.66 1.72   
Mean 1.92 1.94 2.48 2.26 1.62 1.63 2.01 1.84 2.22 2.27 2.61 2.53 2.12 2.32 2.59 2.85 1.62 1.64 1.63 1.62 1.72 1.68 2.02 2.09 2.13 2.27 1.87 1.86 
Highest 1.92 1.94 2.48 2.26 1.94 1.94 2.52 2.27 2.85 2.98 3.18 3.26 3.07 3.07 3.74 4.57 1.93 1.96 1.95 1.93 2.36 2.33 2.54 2.54 2.79 3.04 2.28 2.28 
The table presents the VIF values for each variable and regression of this thesis.
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Appendix 7. Quantile―Quantile Plots 
This appendix includes Q―Q plots with standardized residuals for all regressions 
of Table 4 with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and all regressions of M2 (except 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 and M2 which is 
found on page 35). Plots for the remaining regressions are available upon request. 
Figure A14. Q―Q plot for regression (2) 
 
Figure A15. Q―Q plot for regression (5) 
 
Figure A16. Q―Q plot for regression (7) 
 
Figure A17. Q―Q plot for regression (8) 
 
Figure A18. Q―Q plot for regression (10) 
 
Figure A19. Q―Q plot for regression (14) 
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Appendix 8. Single Obs. Influence on Ineq. Coef. 
This appendix presents the influence from exclusion of each observation 
(individually) on the negativity of the inequality variable’s coefficient (vertical axes 
represent p-values for one-tailed test of negative inequality coefficient under H0: 
𝛽𝐼𝑁𝐸𝑄 = 0). Every model with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as inequality regressor and each estimate of 
M2 are included except regression (6) (see Figure 6, page 36). Plots for the 
remaining regressions are available upon request. 
 
Fig. A20. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (2)
 
Fig. A21. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (5) 
 
 
Fig. A22. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (7) 
 
 
Fig. A23. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (8) 
 
 
Fig. A24. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (10) 
 
 
Fig. A25. Single obs. ineq. influence in reg. (14) 
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Appendix 9. Cook’s Distances 
This appendix presents Cook’s distances for all observations in six regressions. 
Each regression model with 𝑀𝐺𝐼𝑁𝐼 as inequality regressor and each estimate of 
M2 are included, except regression (6) which is found in Figure 7 on page 37. Plots 
for the remaining regressions are available upon request. 
 
Fig. A26. Cook’s distances for regression (2)
 
Fig. A27. Cook’s distances for regression (5) 
 
Fig. A28. Cook’s distances for regression (7)
 
Fig. A29. Cook’s distances for regression (8) 
 
Fig. A30. Cook’s distances for regression (10)
 
Fig. A31. Cook’s distances for regression (14) 
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Appendix 10. List of Variables 
Variable Description Dataset 
   
BMP Black market (relative) premium, measured in 1980. GDNGD 
GINI Gini index around year 1980. WIID 3.3 
GR8007 Average annual growth of GDP per capita in 1980-2007. PWT 8.1 
HC Proxy for human capital, measured as average years of 
schooling undertaken by individuals ≥25 years old, data for 
year 1980. 
BLD 2.0 
IHC Index of Human Capital in 1980. PWT 8.1 
INV Gross domestic investment rate relative to GDP in 1980. WDI 
LNGDPPC Natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in 2005 USD) in year 
1980. 
PWT 8.1 
LNGER Proxy for human capital, measured as the natural logarithm of 
primary schooling enrollment rate in 1980. 
UIS.Stat 
MGINI MGINI based on GINI around year 1980. GFSY, PWT 8.1, 
WDI, WIID 3.3 
NSGINI Standardized Gini based on net incomes in 1980. SWIID 5 
NSMGINI Standardized MGINI based on net incomes in 1980. GFSY, PWT 8.1, 
SWIID 5, WDI 
SOG Proxy for size of government, measured as government 
expenditure relative to GDP per capita in 1980. 
PWT 8.1 
   BLD is the Barro-Lee Educational Attainment Dataset, Barro-Lee (2013). GDNGD is the Global Development Network 
Growth Database, Easterly (2001). GFSY is the Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, IMF (1989). PWT is the Penn 
World Table, Feenstra et al. (2015). SWIID is the database by the same name, Solt (2014). UIS.Stat is the database by the 
same name, UNESCO (2015). WDI is the World Development Indicators, World Bank (2015). WIID is the database by the 
same name, UNU-WIDER (2015). 
